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The purpose of this thesis was to determine whether a right to privacy exists within the
body of the Constitution. Knowing that such a right is not textually explicit, I chose to examine
arguments concerning both the intent of the founding fathers and the idea that a right to privacy
exists as a human right. I also examined an extensive body of case law to determine how the
Supreme Court has defended such a right as implicit in the Constitution. Based upon my findings
in the literature and constitutional law, I determined that a right to privacy is protected by
constitutional text.
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INTRODUCTION
"Civilization is the progress toward a society ofprivacy. The savage's whole existence is public,
ruled by the laws of his tribe. Civilization is the process of setting man free from men. "
- AynRand

The codification of law is and always has been the most difficult task in fonning a new
government. Laying down a series of laws that are designed to govern the people while
simultaneously allowing them independence through rights and liberties, is a challenge that
cannot go without its struggles and its controversies. The fonnation of the United States
Constitution was no different.
The document has met with serious debate over its meaning since its ratification in 1789.
Ambiguities in the text have led to fierce courtroom battles over what exactly our rights and
liberties inherent in the Bill of Rights and the seventeen subsequent amendments entail. One of
the most recent, notwithstanding most popular, constitutional quarrels, has been over the right to
pnvacy.
There is no line of text in the Constitution that guarantees the people a right to privacy, but
there a number of vague -

yet striking -

allusions to a right to privacy within the body of the

document. As arbiter of the law, the Supreme Court has had to mediate these battles and
detennine what, if anything, in the Constitution points to a potential right to privacy. Arguments
on either side have rested on the intent of the Framers, the lack of explicit text, the appropriate
level of interpretation necessary for interpreting the Constitution, and the various references to
something hidden in the language of the law.
Without solid textual grounding, it is difficult to imagine articulating any solid evidence that
such a constitutional right exists. Through an examination ofthe Court, the history of privacy as
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a concept, and the history of privacy as law, however, I will provide evidence to show that there
is such a right to privacy implicitly explicit within the body of the Constitution.
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BACKGROUND
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. "
- Chief Justice John Marshall

It is essential that one have a basic understanding of the history and function of the
Supreme Court before delving further into the issue of privacy as a constitutionally protected
right. I will later return to these issues and terms without pausing for detailed explanation, so it is
pertinent that one become acquainted - if only briefly - with the complex inner and outer
workings of the Court before attempting to process the more complicated information that I will
present in coming sections.

THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
The inception. The Supreme Court became a staple of the American legal system with the

ratification of the United States Constitution and the passage of the Federal judiciary Act of
1789. 2 Article III of the United States Constitution made the provision for a federal judiciary
with a single superior court. It was this act of Congress, however, that gave the United States
Supreme Court its prominence in the judicial system. 3 Article III also laid out the initial powers
of the Court, which, in truth, were extremely limited. The powers of the Supreme Court, under
the Constitution, were limited to hearing cases upon original, mandatory, and appellate
jurisdiction as defined and recommended by the United States Congress. 4 Congress was given
the power to define which types of cases, and even how many cases, the Court would hear. 5 The
Court's original jurisdiction involves "all cases, in law and equity, arising under this [sic]

2 Federal

Judiciary Act of 1789.
Ibid and United States Constitution, Article III.
4 United States Constitution, Article III.
5 Ibid, Article II.
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Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties.,,6 More generally, the original
jurisdiction involves all federal cases, including those affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls involved in disputes to which the United States is a party; suits between

two different states; suits between a state and a citizen of another state; and suits between a state
and/or its citizens and foreign countries. 7 The Court's mandatory jurisdiction includes cases
which it is required to hear because of the structure of the United States court system. Certain
cases, depending upon which path they take through the system, must be appealed directly to the
Supreme Court, and the Court may not refuse to hear these cases. 8 As far as appellate jurisdiction
goes, Congress has Article III powers to decide which types of cases the Court may hear on
appeal, but the primary power of selection lies with the justices of the Court. 9 They receive, on
average, seven thousand petitions per annum. 10 Ninety-five percent of the cases that come before
the Court as petition come on appeal from lower courts. I I Almost all petitions come as requests
for certiorari, whether they are formal legal requests on appeal from lower courts or hand-written
pleas from individuals. When the Supreme Court grants "cert," as the justices call it, they simply
agree to hear a case; conversely, when the Court does not grant cert, it does not qualify as a
ruling or an affirmation of the lower court's decision - only a declaration that the Supreme Court
does not agree to hear the case. 12 On average, of the nearly seven thousand cases petitioned, the
Court only agrees to hear oral arguments in about one hundred per year. 13

David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics, 7th ed., (New York: W.W. Norton and
Co., 2005), p. 164.
7 Ibid, p. 164-165.
8 Ibid, p. 165.
9 Ibid, p. 165.
10 Steve Mount, "The U.S. Constitution Online," 6 October 2005, <http://usconstitution.net> (Accessed 18 October
2005).
11 O'Brien, p. 158.
12 Ibid, p. 165
\3 Mount
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The membership. When the Supreme Court was finally unveiled on February 2, 1790, the

number of justices was set at six under the provisions of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. 14
Congress was given the constitutional power to change the number of justices on the Court as it
saw necessary,15 and the final number was set at nine in 1869, with one chief justice and eight
associate justices. 16 Justices of the Supreme Court must be nominated by the president upon the
vacancy of a seat on the bench or upon the addition of a justice to the Court by an act of
Congress. After formal nomination, the candidate for the justiceship must undergo a
confirmation hearing before the United States Senate, and then must be confirmed by a majority
vote in the Senate. 17 Article III of the Constitution awards all federal judges life tenure under
"good behavior." Typically, justices may vacate their positions by death, voluntary retirement, or
impeachment. 18 It is usually understood that justices are granted life tenure to ensure that they do
not have to appeal to politics to maintain their positions and status. The judicial branch is
supposed to be the arbiter oflaw, not simply of political questions, and so it is widely held that
federal judges should not be subject to election or periodic votes of confidence. In keeping them
out of the immediate political eye, justices are supposed to be free from political influence and
the pressure to conform to either the will of those who put them in power or public opinion.
Though the design is ideal, and objectivity is a noble pursuit, the original intentions do not
always hold sway. During the inception of the Constitution, the public had little say in
government. The elites - in special caucuses - elected the president and senators; only the House
of Representatives was freely elected by the people en masse. 19 Thus, the higher-ups in

Ibid.
Ibid.
th
16 Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court, 7 ed., (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), p. 14.
17 Ibid, p. 14.
18 Ibid, p. 14.
19 Richard Davis, Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court Nomination Process, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005), p. 86.
14
15
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government, including the justices, were not subject to critique by democratic process. Over the
next two hundred years, however, there was a shift toward greater democratic participation. The
advent of universal manhood suffrage,20 woman suffrage,21 the direct election of senators,22 and
the media's interest in politics put all members ofthe federal government in the spotlight. This is
especially seen when cases of extreme controversy, such as those dealing with abortion or gay
rights, are placed on the Court's docket. Cable news stations like CNN and MSNBC announce
the impending cases and air the arguments on both sides before the justices have a chance to hear
oral arguments in court. The major cases tried in the Supreme Court now are also first tried in the
court of public opinion, and though there is no requirement that the justices conform to the will
of the public, only rarely do they hand down rulings that seem to oppose the general public
consensus. Their job necessarily involves paying attention to what the public wants, and in order
"to persist and function effectively ... [the Court] must continuously try to amass and husband
the good will of the public.,,23 In the event that a Supreme Court decision is not met with support
by the public, the law makes provisions for override. Congress may issue remedial legislation to
change the law in question or it may issue statutory override, which then becomes the law until
the statutory change is challenged in case before the Supreme Court. The responsibility of
enforcement lies with the executive branch, and the executives are by no means required to
enforce these decisions. 24 If President Dwight D. Eisenhower had not demanded the National
Guard to enforce public school integration following the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of

United States Constitution, Amendment XV
Ibid, Amendment XIX
22 Ibid, Amendment XVII
23 Jeff Yates, Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in the Supreme Court, (Albany: State
University of New York, 2002), p. 16.
24 Yates, p. 17

20

21
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Education of Topeka, for example, it is possible that widespread integration would never have
occurred.
The most effective - and consequently the most difficult to execute - method for
overriding a Supreme Court decision is through constitutional amendment. Only six decisions
have ever been overruled by constitutional amendment, the most prominent being the Civil War
Amendments' override of the Dred Scott decision of 1857?5 The Dred Scott decision declared
that slaves were not citizens, and could therefore be treated simply as property. The Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments make up the Civil War Amendments, granting slaves
freedom, citizenship, and suffrage, respectively. 26
The revolution. Until the turn of the nineteenth century, the judicial branch was, as
Founding Father Alexander Hamilton very accurately put it, "the least dangerous branch" of the
federal government. 27 The Court had no real checks on the other two branches, and
consequently, it had no real power to stand on when faced with pressure from the legislature or
the executive. The president had the power to nominate justices and refuse to enforce their
decrees. The House of Representatives had the power to draw Articles ofImpeachment against
justices. The Senate held the power to confirm or deny justices a seat on highest bench, and also
to try them during impeachment hearings. The Court, on the other hand, could do very little to
affect policy or to check the other branches. It could only hear cases brought to it, and could not
overturn laws. The interpretation of the law at the tum of the century rested on the prospect that
all legislation passed was perfectly conformable to the Constitution. Thus, the balance of power
among the triumvirate was, in a word, unbalanced.

O'Brien, p. 350.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
27 O'Brien, p. 30.

25

26
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In 1803, however, the "least dangerous branch" let its ultimate power be known. In

Marbury v. Madison, the Court decided that Congress had overstepped its Article III powers to
determine the original jurisdiction of the Supreme COurt,28 and declared the act of Congress
invalid on its face, and thus - using the term for the first time - unconstitutiona1.

29

In his opinion

for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall declared that "it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is," and that the Court was vested with the power
of judicial review - the ability to interpret the law with respect to the Constitution, and overturn
any law, statute, policy, or act of Congress that it felt was not in accordance with the laws of the
document. 30 In what is called the judiciary's first activist decision, the Court handed itself its
greatest power - a power that has not met with legitimate challenge since its inception. Few can
dissent in allowing the arbiter of the law the ability to ensure that the laws passed by Congress
adhere to the "supreme law of the land.,,31 Not allowing the judiciary this power could, in effect,
have allowed legislative institutions to pass and maintain unjust laws and policies - such as the
segregation laws in existence until the landmark ruling in Brown v. Board. 32
Though the Supreme Court gave itself this incredible power, it was at first lax in using it.
It was used for the first time in Marbury, but it was not to strike down an act of Congress again
until the Dred Scott case of 1857 - fifty-four years later. 33 Since that implementation of judicial
review, however, the Court's willingness to overturn laws has increased substantially. As shown
in Table 1, the Court has overturned one hundred forty-eight laws in whole or in part since 1790:

Ibid, p. 30.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
30 Ibid, at 177.
31 Charles Fried, Saying What the Law Is: The Constitution in the Supreme Court, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press), p. 40.
32 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33 O'Brien, p. 30.

28

29
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Table 1:
Number of Federal Statutes Held Unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,
1790-1999
Period
Number
Period
Number
1790-1799
0
1900-1909
9
1800-1809
1
1910-1919
6
1810-1819
0
1920-1929
15
1820-1829
0
1930-1939
13
1830-1839
0
1940-1949
2
1840-1849
0
1950-1959
5
1850-1859
1
1960-1969
16
1860-1869
4
1970-1979
20
1870-1879
7
1980-1989
16
1880-1889
4
1990-1999
24
1890-1899
5
Total
148
tr
Source: Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court, 7 ed., (Washington, D.C.: CO
Press, 2001).

Though we can see that the Court has been active in using judicial review in federal cases, it
has been more likely to do so in cases of state laws and local ordinances. Table 2 shows us that
the Court has overturned more than twelve hundred of these lower laws since 1790:
Table 2:
Number of State Laws and Local Ordinances Held Unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, 1790-1999
Period
Number
Period
Number
1790-1799
0
1900-1909
40
1
1910-1919
1800-1809
118
1810-1819
7
1920-1929
139
1820-1829
1930-1939
8
93
1940-1949
57
1830-1839
3
1840-1849
1950-1959
9
61
1850-1859
1960-1969
7
149
1860-1869
23
1970-1979
193
1980-1989
162
1870-1879
36
1990-1999
61
1880-1889
46
1,249
Total
1890-1899
36
Source: Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court, 7'" ed., (Washington, D.C.: CO
Press, 2001).
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Though the Supreme Court has overturned nearly one hundred fifty federal statutes in whole or
in part, it does not necessarily imply that Congress has been entirely upset about each. Congress
is more likely to severely oppose the Court's decisions when it invalidates a statute close to the
time of its inaction or when it is done at a consistent rate. The striking down of older statutes or
sporadic invalidation is much less likely to stir up conflict between the legislative and judicial
branches. 34 The Court is much more likely to overturn state laws and city ordinances than it is
federal statutes for one primary reason: When the Court overturns a lower law, it does not place
the Court at odds with the other two branches of the federal government. 35
A cult ofpersonality. Ideology has become an important criterion in the selection of

Supreme Court nominees, and this fact will play an important role in later discussion of political
beliefs intervening in the successful arbitration and interpretation of the law. The Court's
primary purpose is and always has been the truthful, honest, and objective interpretation of the
Constitution and the statutory laws ofthe United States. But personal preference has a way of
sneaking into this supposedly objective analysis. The ultimate aim - and difficulty - for
members of the Court is to strike a balance between these personal preferences and the accurate
interpretation ofthe law as faithful to the Constitution. 36

A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION

Baum, p. 196
Ibid, p. 198.
36 Ibid, p. 157.

34

35
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The constitutional revolution of 1803 lays the foundation for the remainder of this
analysis in its formation of an activist logic in interpreting the Constitution. The power of
judicial review and the subsequent policy of judicial activism form the basis for a discussion of
privacy as a constitutionally protected right. We must look, herein, at how judicial review plays a
role in a loose interpretation of the Constitution, how a strict interpretation imposes judicial
restraint, and how these theories differ from one another.
The non-interpretivist approach. The non-interpretivist approach is often referred to as a
loose construction of the Constitution. Patrons of this interpretation insist that the Framers wrote
the Constitution so as to be a living document, applicable to any issues which might arise over
time. They believe that the Constitution is flexible and ambiguous, and that liberties must be
taken in interpreting what the Framers' actually intended. In short, the non-interpretivist
approach "frequently requires going beyond text and historical context to structural arguments
grounded in the Constitution and to broader principles of constitutional politics.,,37
Judicial review plays a key role in the non-interpretivist approach. Because of the
ambiguities in the Constitution, interpreters are allowed to decide which laws conform to their
interpretation of constitutional law, and strike down the ones that do not meet their requirements.
The interpretivist approach. The interpretivist approach emphasizes a strict construction
of the Constitution. Supporters of this theory hold that the Constitution should be taken literally,
without room for interpretation. They believe that the Framers' intentions were explicit and
unwavering, and that the document should not actually be interpreted per se, but taken directly word for word - as it was adopted in 1789. In a nutshell, the interpretivist approach holds that

37

O'Brien, p. 302
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"constitutional interpretation should be confined to the text and historical provisions of the
Constitution.,,38
Judicial review is not as much a key component in an interpretivist approach as in the
non-interpretivist approach. The distinction between judicial review as implemented in loose and
strict constructions is that in a loose approach, there is much more room for judicial review.
When interpreting the Constitution broadly, it is easier to strike down legislation as
unconstitutional because there is more space with which to take liberties. With a strict
construction, the only room there is for judicial review is by striking down legislation that
directly conflicts with the explicit text of the Constitution.
Activism and restraint. It is from these two camps that the notions of judicial activism
and judicial restraint arise. Judicial activism itself has been interpreted many ways to include
many different components, but for the purposes of this argument, we must adopt a general, yet
sufficient definition. Activism is a judicial policy that "makes significant changes in public
policy, particularly in policies established by other institutions.,,39 This can mean interpreting the
Constitution very broadly, overturning a long-standing precedent, writing legislation in an
opinion, or striking down laws, statutes, ordinances, or policies. The core of judicial activism is
the idea that judges should not avoid cases, and they should exercise their powers to their fullest
extent. 40
Judicial restraint is simply the tendency to avoid activist policies. This is typically shown
by an adherence to narrow groundings in the Constitution, a refusal to hear certain issues in

Ibid, p. 302
Baum, p. 5.
40 Marvin Schick, "Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court," Supreme Court Activism and Restraint, Stephen C.
Halpern and Charles M. Lamb, eds., (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1982), p. 45.

38

39
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court, a refusal to exercise judicial review, or a refusal to overturn precedent. 41 Judicial review is
generally thought to follow a few certain assumptions about both the operations and purpose of
the judicial branch. First, the justices are appointed not to mix in their personal views with the
law, or to add their own brand of ethics to the nature ofthe Constitution, but to faithfully
interpret the law according to the intent of the Framers. Secondly, the justices are to defer
"political question" to the legislative and executive branches. They are not to rule on issues over
which one of the other branches may exercise control and oversight. Third, the justices are
intended to rely also on statutory construction and not simply on constitutional construction. In
this way, they adhere to the intentions of the Framers, the amendments of the people, and the
laws of the modem land. Fourth, the Supreme Court is only supposed to accept cases where the
parties bringing suit have standing to sue. Cases may not be brought arbitrarily, and the party in
question must have a legitimate case in controversy to present its case to the Court. Fifth, the
justices are not to issue advisory opinions to lower courts. They are to refrain from extending
their opinions to the interpretation of the law in all ways, including disclosing how they feel
about certain issues before they hear them in oral arguments. Finally, the Court should seldom
overrule the policies of the other branches. This should only be done in cases that involve severe
and blatant violations of constitutional provisions. 42
The exercise of judicial activism, to the restraintists, is both anti-democratic and a blatant
usurpation of constitutional power. 43 It allows the Court - as a group of only nine - to govern the
state through the power of policymaking. Regardless of laws drafted, debated, and passed by the
elected members of Congress and signed by the president, the Supreme Court may assume

Ibid, p. 6.
Charles M. Lamb, "Judicial Restraint on the Supreme Court," Supreme Court Activism and Restraint, Stephen C.
Halpern and Charles M. Lamb, eds., (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1982), p. 8.
43 Ibid, p. 9-12.

41

42
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ultimate legislative power by taking an activist stance. It veritably removes the point of freely
electing leaders when their decisions and their labor may be stricken from the record based upon
the ideologies of a few "old" judges. "Americans wind up, on various topics, ruled by nine
persons appointed for life who are more or less immune to the influence of majority
sentiment. ,,44
One of the major misconceptions about the activist-restraint issue is that it follows along
a liberal-conservative divide. Most people associate judicial activism with liberal politics,
claiming that liberals have the desire to give the government more power; similarly, people
associate judicial restraint with conservative politics because conservatives like to minimize the
size and function of the federal government. This traditional division, however, does not hold
true - there can be both liberal and conservative activists. Put simply, a judicial activist can be a
person of any ideology who wishes not to see a certain type of precedent overturned, or a certain
type of right not read into the Constitution. A conservative activist, for example, would seek to
overturn a Supreme Court precedent with a long standing of upholding a right to gay marriage.
Likewise, a liberal activist would seek to overturn long-standing laws prohibiting abortion. 45 The
problem is not in the fact that judicial activism exists, but in where to draw the line in its use. We
can easily see that activists are more inclined to follow a non-interpretivist approach, and
restraintists adopt the interpretivist doctrine, but we also have to realize that given modem
circumstances and the nature of modem problems, we cannot adhere to both. We cannot interpret
solely the text in some cases, and allow ourselves to be more lenient with other passages. To be
consistent - to be legitimate - we must adopt one, and only one, cohesive approach to
constitutional interpretation. Once we have concluded that one is decisively better - or at least
Leslie Friedman Goldstein, In Defense of the Text, (Savage, Maryland: Roman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.,
1991), p. 99.
45 Ibid, p. 158.

44
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more appropriate than one or any other, then we can look more accurately at the passages of the
Constitution, and in turn, develop a better understanding of how to apply these principles to our
laws.

A case for activism. It is no longer 1789. It is no longer 1791. Times have changed, and
life has changed. It is difficult to believe that the text penned in the Constitution 229 years ago is
still applicable today. We should expect, however, the interpretation of our laws to follow the
exodus of social progress. Much of the defense of interpretivism centers on the argument of
Framers' intent. Many claim that the Founding Fathers would not want for us to twist and
mangle the text of the Constitution to suit our needs, but unfortunately, this is a line of argument
that cannot stand. Our needs do not match their needs, nor will they ever again. In the two
hundred twenty-nine years since the ratification of the Constitution, we have seen a second war
for independence, black and woman suffrage, industrial revolution, Civil War, depression, and
other radical changes. It is unfeasible to believe that our modem value system is even remotely
close to that of the Founding Fathers. To adopt the belief that we are supposed to faithfully
adhere to every line and every word of the Constitution as gospel is, as former Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., once said, to ''tum a blind eye to social progress.,,46 There is little room to believe
that the Framers could have foreseen judicial battles over gay rights, abortion, or stem cells, and
to interpret the laws as applied to these unique circumstances as they would or might have been
in the late 1700s is to reduce the value of the human condition. In light of progress and forwardthinking, we must adopt not only a looser interpretation of the Constitution, but also a
willingness to enforce these interpretations and exercise activism.

Lino A. Graglia, "How the Constitution Disappeared," Interpreting the Constitution, Jack N. Rackove, ed.,
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990), p. 35.

46
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Activism is necessary for several reasons. First, an activist approach to constitutional law
allows for greater protection of important but inexplicit rights, such as a right to privacy. The
Constitution, on its face, makes no explicit textual reference to a right to privacy, and even
though the so-called "right" has been part of the American history and tradition since well before
the Constitution was written, a strict interpretation does not make the allowance for reading a
right to privacy into the Constitution. 47 Secondly, and in the same vein, activism allows us to
create rights that mayor may not be explicit in the Constitution. According to the provisions of
the Ninth Amendment, "the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.,,48 Advocates of judicial restraint
argue that it is not our responsibility to "create" rights out of the constitutional cloth. If this were
the case, they say, then there would be no point to having a Constitution at all. However,.again, it
is faulty to assume that the Framers were aware of every possible situation that could arise under
the dictates of the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment was James Madison's way of asserting
that the Framers actually acknowledged that they may not have thought of everything. 49 Third,
judicial activism only helps to strengthen the Court's position as the arbiter of law. The judicial
branch of the government is vested with the interpretation of the law, but if we do not allow
judges and justices to interpret, then they are being denied the ability to faithfully and fully
perform their duties. Ifwe are strictly to adhere to literal text references written more than two
centuries ago, then the arbitration ofthe law is null. Judicial restraint thus relies on good faith
that there will never be exceptions to the rules, that there will never arise a case which mayor

47 Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV, No.5, (15
December 1890), <http://www.1awrence.edulfastiboardmawlPrivacLbrand_warr2.htm1> (Accessed 6 October
2005).
48 United States Constitution, Amendment IX
49 Jeffrey M. Shaman, "Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court's Proper and Historic Function," Judicial
Politics: Readings from 'Judicature,' 3rd ed., Elliot E. Slotnik, ed., (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), p. 43.

17
may not make the words of the Constitution seem vague or overbroad. This, as we have seen
throughout the past two centuries, however, is blatantly false, and the Constitution is rife with
ambiguities in the first place. Article II declares that the president is required to maintain the
"faithful execution" of the law. 50 Article III declares that federal judges will retain their positions
as long as they exhibit "good behavior," but ifnot, may be tried for "high crimes and
misdemeanors.,,51 The Fourth Amendment refers to "unreasonable" searches and seizures. 52 The
Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual" punishment. 53 The Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees certain "privileges and immunities.,,54 Nowhere in the entire document are these
terms clarified, though. We are left with a vague body of laws meant to serve as the "supreme
law of the land," and this gives the judicial department no choice but to interpret. In fact,
textualism at its finest points us in the direction of extratextualism. 55 Even if we take every word
at its face value, these ambiguities force the courts to resort to interpretation. What are literally
"unreasonable" searches and seizures? What qualifies as "cruel and unusual"? Were we able to
ask James Madison to answer these questions, perhaps we would have a resolved debate. For
now, however, we must trust to ourselves, and to our current values, to determine to what these
ambiguities refer.
More than an appeal to ambiguities, however, gives us reason to adopt this approach to
extratextualism and activism. We must recognize that the federal government is already a limited
one, and that there are checks and balances to ensure that judges do not - as textualists fear - run
rampant with the fundamental values of the Constitution. 56 In truth, and to take a radical

United States Constitution, Article II.
Ibid, Article III.
52 Ibid, Amendment IV.
53 Ibid, Amendment VIII.
54 Ibid, Amendment XIV.
55 Goldstein, p. 103.

50

51

56

Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 7-12.
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standpoint, these bedrock principles of the Constitution would exist in our culture with or
without the text to give them meaning. Liberty, equality, community, and solidarity - all
principles upon which America was founded - do not rely on a 229-year-old document for their
survival, meaning, or importance to our culture. We could veritably do away with the
Constitution, and our intuitions about rights and justice and basic values would continue to
thrive. 57 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson even asserted that it was not the Constitution that
should be the torch for America, but the Declaration of Independence, wherein our forefathers
laid out the values for which the country stood. 58 Do away with the Constitution, they said, and
the people may revolt, but the people will not dissolve.
Judges should be the ones to elucidate these bedrock principles where Congress fails to
do so, as well. When the executive and the legislative branches fall short of upholding the rights
and liberties of the people, then it becomes the responsibility of the judiciary - as arbiters of the
law - to ensure that these bedrock values are not compromised. 59 Even if this means taking a step
outside of basic Article III powers, the justices are endowed with the obligation to uphold the
basic principles of the Constitution - this is what we mean when we say that they are supposed to
interpret the document. They are not vested with the power to make it say whatever they would
have it say, but rather, they are entrusted with interpreting the contract so as to maximally
promote these founding principles, and restrict the rights and liberties of the people only when
absolutely necessary.
A final defense, and the one that is most advantageous to the argument at hand, is that
some parts of the human personality are simply not suited for the governmental sphere. 6o First
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and foremost among these characteristics is privacy, the area where the crux of the
activistlrestraintist debate derives. Under this defense, it is recognized that there are just some
things that the government - state, federal, or municipal- has no business interfering with. What
is done in the privacy of one's home, for example, should be none of the government's concern,
with the exception of illegal activity. Some argue that homosexual conduct and illicit drugs are
illegal, regardless of where the acts are performed. We, like the justices, have to recognize the
difference between illegal acts that are justifiably prohibited and those acts that are made illicit
simply out of legislative taste. Those that are not justifiably prohibited should not be regulated by
the government within the private sphere. This is an argument of much controversy, and one we
will return to more fully in the next section when we discuss personal privacy.
The vox popuiaire. It goes without saying that interpretations will run parallel to the

social doctrines of the period in which they are interpreted. It is fairly certain that the ruling in
Roe v. Wade would not have stood in the middle of the nineteenth century, but the 1970s was a

period more amenable to women's rights and issues of personal privacy.61 Though the justices
may have had qualms with interpreting an implicit right to privacy as inclusive of a right to an
abortion, and though the outcry has not died down in the more than thirty years since the
decision, its acceptability is based on the acceptability of prevailing social doctrine. What we
should not do, once we have accepted that the Constitution should be interpreted with respect to
nuance, is ignore the voice of the people. Mob democracy is a dangerous thing, without doubt,
but we cannot pretend to be a democratic republic if we do not at least pay attention to the whim
of the public. Not all public preferences will be reconcilable with the principles of the
Constitution - slavery and the oppression of women certainly were not - but this is the reason
that we have the judicial branch in the first place. The people call for action, the legislators form
61
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their desires into law, the executive chooses to endorse the public's will, and the judiciary then
tells us whether what we want is what we may justly have. We cannot ignore social progress and
we cannot stifle the vox populaire. This is not to say we must try to please all of the people all of
the time, but we must aim toward the just end - to ensure liberty, equality, community, and
solidarity - regardless of a line of text to back us up.
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THE DOCTRINE OF PRIVACY
"It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and
differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases necessarily
used in such a charter. "
- James Madison
What James Madison could not have foreseen with the utterance of these words,
however, was how appropriate they would become some two hundred years later. The text of the
Constitution, though vague and ambiguous, is definite, and it points to a host of specific rights
and liberties granted to the people. With any list, however, there will always be a case that does
not agree entirely with its terms. The First Amendment ensures that we have a right to free
speech, but it does not address that there may be conditions concerning where, when, or how we
may speak. It does not address the possibility of symbolic speech or of speech as conduct. Issues
arise that transcend the text - that occur solely from the change of the times and the
corresponding changes in national values and cultural mores. Others, still, existed from the
beginning, but perhaps were taken as given, and those in whom are vested the responsibilities of
codification simply feel it unnecessary to make them textually explicit. This oversight, or
possible lack of foresight, depending upon your perception of the situation, causes problems for
those whose job it is to interpret what they have penned. We have seen this problem arise in the
last century alone in the issues of desegregation, free speech, elections, private property, and
most notably for this dialogue, the right to privacy.

DEFERENCE TO A HIGHER AUTHORITY
Given the discussion in the previous section, we have little or no reason not to believe
that the Constitution, though devoid of any explicit textual reference to a right to privacy, is not
inclusive of such a right. If we concede that the Supreme Court is vested with the power to fully
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and actively interpret the law - and in many cases this means invoking the power of judicial
review - and if we recognize that judicial activism is an acceptable route for the Supreme Court
to take, then we are left without good reason to deny that the Court may, with reason and
apprehension, read into the Constitution those rights that are not explicit, but necessary for the
faithful order and execution ofliberty. The Court may, from time to time, use the text of the
Constitution to confer rights to the people that are not actually there. This sounds a bit
improvisational for a government that purports to be democratic and liberal - a sort of fly-bythe-seat-of-our-pants rule of law - but it is not as though the Court is simply making up the rules
as it goes. In every instance where they have relied on a right to privacy as a defense for their
decision, they have cited both constitutional provisions and/or common law precedent to justify
their reliance on this constitutional right.
Given the venerable history and tradition of the highest bench, we may justly view them
as legitimate and trustworthy guardians ofthe law. Though we may defer to their authority in
deciding what is there and what is not, it is worth examining their methods and justifications to
determine which cultural values and which lines of the Constitution point to a right to privacy.

THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
What is so special about privacy? Privacy, it has been said, is a notion at least as old as
common law itself. 62 It precedes the drafting of our Constitution, the formation of the United
States, and even the dawn of Western civilization as a whole. The concept itself, beyond the
bounds of the law, has important historical, philosophical, anthropological, and sociological
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significance. 63 Aristotle made the distinction between public and private spheres of life, the latter
being the realm of the home and the family and separate from that of the government. Nineteenth
century utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill, in his essay On Liberty, noted that the public
sphere is that which refers to the appropriate realm of government action, and that there existed a
private world in which the government had no place. Likewise, eighteenth century political
philosopher John Locke, in his Second Treatise on Government, argued that there existed a state
of nature wherein every person had an equal claim to all property - which was all public in its
essence. Locke noted, however, that we own ourselves and our bodies, which are therefore
private. He also declared that a person may come to own private property by "mixing one's labor
with it. ,,64 If a person were to till a piece of land, for example, he or she could come to own it
privately. Sociological anthropologist Margaret Mead said that various cultures - other than
modem Westerners - seek privacy by having certain rituals and ceremonies away from the group
in secret locations. They also seek to keep certain members of the group away from these
practices, so as to have them in private. Also, zoological anthropologist Alan Westin asserted
that animals also look for privacy away from their larger family groups. They go to private
locations to bear their children, to mate, and to die. 65 We can see, then, that privacy is not a
modem innovation, but is perhaps something that is intrinsically valuable and natural, not only
because we are human, but simply by virtue of being alive.
The concept of privacy is not without its criticisms, however. The first and foremost of
these is the basic question of whether there is actually anything special about privacy, in and of
itself. Many contemporary critics argue that every action said to be protected by a fundamental
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right to privacy is likewise protected by other rights and liberties, most notably by the rights of
private property explicit in the Fifth Amendment and by basic bodily security. This reductionist
criticism of privacy, however, cannot be misconstrued in its rhetoric and apparent truth to

encompass all rights under the umbrella of privacy. In Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Supreme
Court ruled that persons have a right, under privacy, to engage in homosexual relations. 66 I fail to
see how this right falls under either the rights of private property or bodily security. A right to
homosexual relations is a right to choose one's lifestyle, and it falls under neither camp, no
matter how broadly we stretch them. We can therefore reject reductionist criticisms of privacy,
and move on to others with more substantial merit.
The second most powerful criticism is the one put forth by feminists. They claim that if
the "private domain [is] free from any scrutiny" then it becomes dangerous to women and
minorities because it allows the perpetuation of discrimination behind closed doors. If the
government is prohibited from entering the sacred walls of the home, it must tum a blind eye to
the crimes - both of physical abuse and repression - committed within them. 67 Though feminists
like Catharine MacKinnon make valid points about crimes committed behind closed doors, their
belief that privacy itself would be the cause for perpetuation is ludicrous. A right to privacy does
not preclude prosecution. The institution of marriage is sacrosanct and protected by the right to
privacy, but it is not immune from the greater state interest of prosecuting domestic violence.
Criminal behavior dissolves the sacredness of the boundaries of privacy, unless the behavior in
question, such as that in Lawrence, can be shown to have its own substantial worth.
Less pertinent to our argument, but still mildly substantial is Richard Posner's economic
criticism of privacy. His claims are less applicable here simply because his arguments concern
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infonnational privacy - the differences between this and the matters actually at hand will be
explained later. Regardless, we may still utilize his thesis in the respect of keeping our private
actions private from active communication in the public sphere. Posner claims that privacy is
only valuable insofar as the infonnation we want to protect is valuable. The less valuable the
infonnation, the less we rely on a right to privacy. This is the reason, he argues, that professors
do not let their students read their letters of recommendation; it undennines the value of the
statement if the author is afraid of offending the student being recommended. 68 I find this thesis
accurate in its observation, but lacking in its authority as a successful criticism of the value of
privacy. Privacy assures us that infonnation disclosed is protected. It allows us to be more
forthcoming to medical professionals, to our attorneys, to our religious leaders, and our spouses.
Truth is protected and secured when privacy is guaranteed. Ifwe were to remove the protection
of infonnational privacy from the doctor-patient relationship, then we might feel less confident
about releasing embarrassing infonnation about ourselves to a professional who might better
help us were he or she privy to this knowledge. Even worse, removing this confidence could
allow those with alternative or unpopular lifestyles to become targets of crime or discrimination.
Privacy itself makes these relationships fruitful, and so Posner's claim that there is nothing
special about it falls far short of accuracy.
Other criticisms of privacy rights include the non-constitutionality of the phrase and the
fact that reading it into the law, as the Supreme Court appears to have done, amounts to judicial
activism. I believe that previous statements are enough to rule out these final critiques,
considering that we have already accepted that judicial activism is not a detriment to the power
and validity of the Constitution, and also that extratextualism may be appropriate in some
regards.
68
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Though the major criticisms have been overcome, we still have the lingering question:
What is so special about privacy? Privacy is special for no other reason than that it is part of our
"inviolate personality" as human beings. 69 Though Westin concluded that animals also have an
innate notion of privacy, this only shows that privacy transcends the manmade world, and is
something of which we have a natural concept. We speak of privacy hereafter, however, as a
feature of humanity and basic human dignity.7o It is a necessary condition for the human race to
lead valuable lives, to have intimate relationships, and to feel that we possess something special
which no one and no government can take from us. What is special about privacy is its moral
significance. Privacy ensures autonomy and dignity, and "has moral value because it shields us
in all ... contexts by providing certain freedom and independence - freedom from scrutiny,
prejudice, pressure to conform, exploitation, and the judgment of others.'.7l Privacy gives us
status as moral actors and "protects us from unwanted access by others.'.72
Moreover, some degree of privacy is necessary for the people to trust their government.
How free would any of us feel if our homes, our bodies, or our lives were subject to random
government inspection or control?73 The very concept is overtly Orwellian, but simply imagine
what our natural reaction would be if our government suddenly adopted such a position on
privacy. We would lose all faith in the stewardship of our leaders, and we would make a
conscious effort to hide the pieces of our lives to which we did not want others to have access. If
nothing else, this example illustrates that we value our privacy as having some intrinsic worth,
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namely, that it allows us to live freely without fear of intrusion - to own all the dignity afforded
us as human beings.

Two interpretations. It is generally accepted that Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D.
Warren made the first mention of any "right to be let alone" in American legalese. Their
pUblication in the Harvard Law Review, aptly titled The Right to Privacy, identified that not only
was privacy instrumental in the function of government and daily life, but that it was also the
responsibility of the law to adapt itself to make room for it. Arguably the first patrons of serious
judicial activism, Brandeis and Warren asserted that "political, social, and economic changes
entail the recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the
new demands of society.,,74 Reliant on history, custom, and their beliefs about what the Founding
Fathers intended in the ratification of the Bill of Rights, The Right to Privacy points to a
fundamental right to be let alone, textually explicit or not.
It is worth noting, however - not to contradict my argument, but in the end to strengthen

it - that the type of privacy Brandeis and Warren were so adamant about protecting is not the
type of privacy on which the remainder of this thesis will focus. Brandeis and Warren's concept
of privacy is the traditional notion - what I will call hereafter the "Fourth Amendment
interpretation of privacy." The type of privacy with which my argument is concerned is the less
tangible version - the privacy of person. I will explain each in tum.
The Fourth Amendment states that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
... ,,75 This may be slightly confusing, since I have identified the second type of privacy as
privacy of person and yet the word "person" is mentioned in the Fourth Amendment. To clarify,
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"person" in the Fourth Amendment sense refers to the physical person. In other words, our
physical bodies are free from unwarranted search and seizure, whereas the second type of
privacy will focus more on the intangible aspects of personhood.

In the physical sense, the right of privacy is limited to those who are in a place that a
person would reasonably expect to be private, such as a home, a phone booth, a hotel room, a
car, etc. 76 There is a general acceptance that we have a right to privacy vis-a-vis home invasion,
security of documents, and intrusion on the physical body, but there is debate concerning the
breadth of the Fourth Amendment's protection. Over time, the amendment has grown to include
the privacy of personal information, and this intensifies the competition between the individual
and the government's "need to know."n
Technology was technically the first real threat to any right to privacy. Until telephones,
wiretaps, computers, surveillance cameras, cell phones, PDAs, and global satellite positioning,
just to name a few, became the norm, there was little fear that a person's privacy could be
invaded. People were secure in their homes, save only from the occasional peeping tom. 78
Nevertheless, the individual and the state have been able to strike a compromise when it comes
to a right to privacy concerning both information and physical boundaries. The use of search
warrants allows persons a reasonable degree of privacy while allowing the government access to
information it finds pertinent, so long as the state (as officers of the law or government officials)
can convey to a judge a relevant and convincing belief - called "probable cause" or "reasonable
grounds" - that the information it seeks is in a particular private location. Warrants must also be
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tailored so that they narrowly define the items, evidence, or information sought; they may not be
used as licenses to "go fishing," so to speak. 79
Controversial though it may remain, it appears as though the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy has all but been declared universally accepted. It is also often taken for granted that "the
Supreme Court has been explicit in ruling that privacy is a central reason for Fourth Amendment
protection ... ", even though the word is not so much as mentioned in the text of the amendment.
The problem and the crux ofthe controversy over a right to privacy, we see, occurs when, as
Brandeis and Warren said, the necessity arises "to define anew the exact nature and extent of
such protection.,,8o Their words laid the ground for a more contemporary version of a right to
privacy, and the one on which the remainder of this argument will address.
The notion of a broader interpretation of privacy - the privacy of person - puts the entire
issue of privacy in a very different context, one in which "the government attempts to limit the
choices of individuals in various personal areas, such as use of contraception or abortion, whom
to marry, and the right to choose how to rear and educate one's children.,,81 What we mean here
is something decidedly more intimate than any conception of physical security as privacy. This is
a personal privacy which comprises the privacy of decision, choice, preference, lifestyle, and
self. Personal privacy seeks to protect both the tangible body and the less solid idea of the
choices that affect it. "It has generally been viewed as a right protecting one's individual interest
in independence in making certain important and personal decisions about one's family, life, and
lifestyle. 82 When we broaden the concept of privacy to include more than the physical self or
surrounding, then we allow such issues as abortion, contraception, sodomy, death, education,
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religion, marriage, medical treatment, and physician-assisted suicide to fall under the umbrella of
a right to privacy.
This is the controversy with privacy. No one argues that we have a right to feel secure in

our homes, or that our conversations are private unless they become the subject of some
compelling government interest such as national security or criminal prosecution, but if we
affirm a fundamental right to privacy, we let in all ofthe above controversial topics,
guaranteeing ourselves fundamental rights to abortion, procreation, prevention of procreation,
marriage, homosexuality, death, and so on. We tiptoe on dangerous ground in declaring that a
fundamental right to privacy exists, as many a conservative dissent will show in the discussion of
case law, but can we use a slippery slope argument to deny the people what Brandeis and Warren
called one of the rights "most valued among civilized men,,?83 I, like the Supreme Court, have
reservations with doing this. The right to privacy has been declared a fundamental right over and
over again in the text of common law, thus elevating it to the level of free speech and freedom of
the press. The great risk posed in doing this was, is, and will remain the same: There is no right
to privacy in the Constitution. Unfortunately, no amount of rhetoric can change that - only a
constitutional amendment can make it textually explicit, and given the bevy of controversial
topics which would become irrefutable if such an amendment were added, we can say with
certainty that we will not have to worry about it at any time in the near future.
The task before me, however, is to show that a right to privacy actually exists, and to do
that, I will have to show that even though the right to privacy is not textually explicit in the
Constitution, the language of the document, coupled with history, custom, tradition, and original
intent, is sufficient to make the right implicit enough to call it explicit. We have already
established that a loose interpretation of the Constitution is not only acceptable, but required to
83
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keep the Constitution in tune with the times, so there is no harm in looking into the text to see if
it permits a right to privacy. To do this, I turn to common law and the opinions ofthe venerable
justices appointed to Supreme Court. Based on their opinions and judgments of the law, we will
see that there is enough evidence in the document that a right to privacy ought to be considered
one of our fundamental freedoms.

32
PERCEIVING PRIVACY
"Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the
Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might
have been more specific. " - Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy

Though we well established in the last section that there is no explicit right to privacy
within the body of the Constitution, we may interpret the document broadly enough so as to
encompass such a right. In no way will we be simply creating this right from the mere desire for
it, as many interpretivist critics would argue, but rather, we look to the insinuations of other
rights and the suggestions of several amendments for our foundation. The Supreme Court has
relied on such nuances for more than forty years to ground and verify the right to privacy. We
look now to their decisions in several major privacy cases and the grounds they rely on to justify
their "creation" of a right to privacy.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
As early as 1923, the Supreme Court began using a privacy-type defense in its decisions.
Though a right to privacy was never specifically invoked, cases like Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), both of which concerned parents' rights to raise and
educate their children and were decided based on the notion of liberty in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, laid the foundation for a right to privacy inherent in the same
c1ause. 84 In his dissent in the 1928 case of Olmstead v. Us., Justice Louis D. Brandeis first
articulated the now famous phrase "the right to be let alone," derived from his joint publication
with Samuel D. Warren. 85 In 1944, the Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to issue
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fundamental status to the right to procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma.

86

These cases all referred to

topics later deemed and understood as private, though they were cited so at the time. The major
advancement, however, was still several decades in the making.

In 1965, everything known about privacy law in the United States changed. The Supreme
Court handed down its decision in the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut. Estelle
Griswold, executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and the league's
medical director, a Yale-educated, licensed physician, were both convicted under a Connecticut
statute criminalizing the dissemination of both information regarding contraception and
contraceptive devices themselves. The Connecticut statute made it a crime for any person to use
a "drug or article" to prevent conception, and the doctors had given information to a married
woman and prescribed her a contraceptive device for personal use. 87 The particular section of the
law in question also declared that "any person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires, or
commands another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as ifhe were the
principal offender.,,88 Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court in the [vote]
decision which affirmed the right to privacy for the first time. In asserting that access to and
distribution of contraception to married persons was a matter of privacy, Douglas declared that
though there was no right to privacy explicit in the text of the Constitution, there was evidence of
such a right in the "penumbras" and "emanations" of several constitutional amendments. 89 The
Court has recognized, Douglas said, that the First Amendment includes at least one peripheral
right, and also several insinuations within it that allude to a right to privacy.90 There is no right of
association mentioned in the First Amendment, Douglas correctly declared, but he points out that
Skinner v. State of Oklahoma. Ex. Rei. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), at 541.
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the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right to privacy in one's associations based on the
First Amendment in the case of NAACP v. Alabama. 91 The First Amendment reads: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.,,92 Though it makes no
textual reference to a right to associate as one chooses, it is interpreted, through the religion
clauses and the right to assemble, that the First Amendment contains a penumbral right of
privacy in the right of association. 93 Douglas goes on to articulate the "various guarantees
[within the Constitution that] create zones ofprivacy.,,94 In addition to the First Amendment,
there is also the Third Amendment's proscription that "no soldier shall ... be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the owner ... ,,95 The Fourth Amendment guarantees the "right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.,,96 The Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause protects the privacy
of the self. 97 Finally, Douglas declares that the Ninth Amendment's allowance for the retention
of un enumerated rights likewise alludes to a right to privacy.98 Based on so many textual
references, or insinuations, of a right to privacy, the Court held that such a right to privacy must
be broad enough to encompass the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" and the right of
married persons to prevent conception. 99
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Justice Arthur Goldberg's concurring opinion relies primarily on the unenumerated rights
clause in the Ninth Amendment, which reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."IOO The very

language of the Ninth Amendment points to the idea that a right to privacy may be interpreted as
part of the document, if societal evidence exists to show the people believe they should have
such a right. "The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers ofthe
Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights ... which exist alongside those
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments."IOI The
entire purpose of including such an amendment, Goldberg declares, was to quiet fears about
adopting a document that contained an explicit list ofthe people's rights. Including the Ninth
Amendment gave the government a way to proverbially cover all of its bases in case they forgot
something. 102 Goldberg goes on to point out that in the I Annals of Congress 439, James
Madison specifically stated this purpose to Congress amid arguments that granting certain rights
to the people would disparage others not mentioned. Madison conceded that this was the best
argument against the ratification of the Bill of Rights, but that the Ninth Amendment would
serve as an adequate safeguard because it would allow for the later inclusion of rights not
specifically guaranteed at that particular time. 103 In no way could the Framers have intended the
first eight amendments to the Constitution to be an exhaustive list of all of the rights retained by
the people. To do so would have been not only to commit an injustice against the people they
were claiming to serve, but also to err in their judgment ofthe people's values. The Ninth
Amendment does nothing to "broaden the powers of the Court," but it lends support to the Due
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Process Clauses' conceptions of liberty inherent in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by not
limiting their incorporation to the literal text ofthe first eight amendments. 104 "To hold that a
right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy ... may
be infringed because that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments
to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever.,,105
Justice John Marshall Harlan II's concurring opinion relied on the concept of substantive
due process for its justification of contraception as an aspect of privacy. Such aspects, he argued,
are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," a phrase first uttered in the case of Palko v.

Connecticut. 106 Rights deemed fundamental must meet with the standards and norms of society
and the deep traditions of history in the United States, and these rights must be dictated by the
bounds of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Byron White also
concurred on the grounds ofliberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that "no state
shall ... deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property without due process oflaw. 107 Substantive
due process involves claims which arise under the liberty aspect of the Due Process Clause, and
in this case, Justices Harlan and White claim that privacy is in accordance with concept of liberty
as it arises here. IDS
In conclusion from Griswold, we see that "taken together, those amendments indicate a
fundamental concern with the sanctity of the home and the right ofthe individual to be [let]
alone.,,109 Moreover, it is clear that "the Bill of Rights ... reflects the concern of James Madison
and other Framers for protecting specific aspects of privacy ... ,,110
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Griswold's companion case, Eisenstadt v. Baird, addressed the same right to
contraception as it applies to single persons. In Eisenstadt, the conviction involved the
dissemination of contraceptives to an unwed woman after a lecture describing their use. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court set aside the conviction for exhibiting the contraceptives,
but upheld the conviction for distribution. III As written, the law in question in this case allowed
for the distribution of contraception to married persons, however, only for the prevention of
disease, not the prevention of conception. Singles were not allowed to obtain contraceptive
devices and only doctors or pharmacists were allowed to prescribe such devices. I 12 Eisenstadt
was decided on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, as well as on the tenets of

Griswold. The idea is that the need for contraception is equal between married and single
persons, and once you allow it for one, as in Griswold, you must allow it for both.ll3 In citing

Griswold, the case also affirms the principles of the penumbras and emanations apparent in the
first eight amendments, the enumeration clause of the Ninth Amendment, and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The major significance of Eisenstadt, however, is that it
affirms that privacy is not simply an aspect of the sanctified union of marriage, but an aspect of
citizenship. Justice William Brennan asserts in his majority 6-3 opinion:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in

the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an individual
entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. I 14
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The 1967 case of Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of marriage
as it relates to privacy. Having previously decided that there is something sacrosanct about the
marital bedroom in Griswold, the Court was now faced with deciding that marriage itself, and
not just its bedroom activities, was fundamental to the notion of privacy.
Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, married in
Washington, D.C., and returned to Virginia in June of 1958. In October of 1958, the couple was
indicted under a Virginia antimiscegenation law. The Lovings pleaded guilty in January of 1959,
and they were sentenced to one year in jail for their crime. The trial judge agreed to suspend their
sentence for twenty-five years pursuant on the condition that the couple leave the state and not
return for those twenty-five years. The Lovings agreed and moved to the District of Columbia. In
1963, they filed a motion to have the judgment vacated on the grounds that it violated both the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia upheld the constitutionality of Virginia's antimiscegenation law, arguing
that the state's legitimate purpose in restricting who could marry whom was to preserve racial
integrity and that there was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause insofar as the Fourteenth
Amendment is construed to mean that equality can be applied separately to the races, so long as
it is applied equally. I IS
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, arguing that the only justification for the law
was purely based on race, and was therefore a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. I 16 The Court also said that such a law also deprives the Lovings of their
liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted .... The freedom to
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marry, or not marry ... cannot be infringed by the state.,,117 Though the reference to the Due
Process Clause and Chief Justice Earl Warren's insistence that the state may not intervene in a
couple's decision to marry -

or a single person's decision not to -

do not specifically mention

a right to privacy, Loving has been cited multiple times as the case that affirms marriage is
included in those actions under privacy's umbrella.
In the 1969 case of Stanley v. Georgia, a unanimous Court also extended the right to
privacy to cover the possession and viewing of obscene materials in the home. Under the
guidance of the First and Fourth Amendments, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in his majority
opinion that "whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do
not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home."IIS This portion ofthe defense rested
obviously on the Fourth Amendment protection of houses and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, but the real crux of the defense in Stanley came from Marshall's next few
lines, dictating that a more personal form of privacy was at issue in this case. Marshall declared
that "if the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read, or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of the giving government the power to control men's
minds.,,119 The Court, more adamantly than in Griswold, thus affirmed that the First Amendment
contains an implicit right to privacy in its periphery. Not only, they insisted, does the home
constitute a "zone of privacy," but so, too, do the minds of men.
The Court further expanded the notion of a First Amendment right to privacy when it
once again tackled the right of parents to rear their children according to their own choice. The
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Court had already decided in Meyer that parents have a right to teach their children a foreign
language under the liberty principle in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause:
Without doubt, [the Due Process Clause] denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. 120
In like fashion, the Court agreed in Pierce that parents have a right to send their children to
private schools if they choose to do so. The state of Oregon had passed a Compulsory Education
Act in 1922 requiring that all students attend public school. 121 Relying heavily on its two-yearprior opinion in Meyer, the Court declared that the Due Process Clause also covers the right of
parents to choose the path of the children's education. "The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.,,122 As
the law stood, it unreasonably interfered ''with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control.,,123 These two cases, though making no
mention of privacy as the foundation for their justification, laid the groundwork for the 1972
case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, which translated the liberty principle of the Due Process Clause as
inclusive of a private right to choose one's religion and education according to religion under the
conditions of the First Amendment.
In 1972, several members of the Amish population of Green County, Wisconsin, were
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public schooling after the eighth grade. The law required that all children remain in the school
system - public or private -

until age 16. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the conviction

on appeal, but in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, declaring that it is within the First
and Fourth Amendments' tenets for parents to decide how far their children can be educated
according to their religious beliefs. 124 The Amish did not object to early elementary education
because children needed to learn the basics of reading, writing, and arithmetic to read the Bible
and participate actively in a normal Amish life. 125 They objected, however, on the grounds that:
Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary
to Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an
environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on
competition in class work and sports and with pressure to conform
to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also
because it takes them away from their community, physically and
emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of
life. 126
The Amish argued that requiring their children to attend school when it was detrimental to the
very way of life they held dear was both a violation of the First Amendment right to the free
exercise of their religion and their Fourteenth Amendment right to raise their children according
to their own values. 127 The Court agreed with their sentiments, and Chief Justice Warren Burger
attempted to quiet fears that allowing Amish families to dictate the terms of their children's
education would lead to a slippery slope allowing all sorts of fanatical or fundamentalist groups
to propagate dangerous views to their children. "A way oflife that is odd or even erratic," he
wrote, "but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is
different.,,128
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The state still has an interest in the education of its children as far as interference with the
rights of or harm to others is concerned, but it cannot act in an all-encompassing parens patriae
role. To allow this would be to allow the government to have control over our most intimate
choices. 129 Like Meyer and Pierce before it, Wisconsin v. Yoder, makes no explicit mention of
the word privacy, but it does emphasize a reliance on religion and the level of intimacy involved
in such a choice or association. The Court already declared in NAACP v. Alabama that a person
has a right to associational privacy, but Yoder goes much deeper than that. Choosing one's
religion and choosing to live according to its precepts is one of the most intimate decisions a
person can make in his or her lifetime. The fact that it is not mentioned explicitly as private does
not make it any less so. By declaring that the state may not interfere in one's choice of religion
or - with reasonable expectation -

one's free exercise thereof, the Court has, in essence,

declared that choice itself is a zone of privacy. Some decisions are so intimate, so entangled with
the very nature of what it means to be a person, that they are free from all government intrusion.
The state may not -

I dare say, cannot -

enter my mind and tell me how to think. The conduct

by which we act may be regulated, but my decisions, my choices, and my thoughts are my own,
and therefore private. They fall under the realm of privacy precisely because they are outside the
realm of government interference.
At the beginning of the 1970s, however, the face of privacy rights in the United States
underwent their most dramatic and controversial change to date. "No longer was the Court
legislating at the margins against curious, outdated, and nationally unpopular state laws" like
those in Griswold and in Loving, but now was tackling greater and highly divisive "in bold and
broad strokes.,,130 The case was, of course, the landmark 1973 case of Roe v. Wade, and the
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aftershock of the decision still tears through political debate thirty-three years later. Arguably,
Roe is one of the most controversial cases the Court has ever decided, and more readily
defensible, it is the most contentious privacy case to which the Court has ever granted cert. In
1972, a pregnant single woman, known in the case under the pseudonym Jane Roe to protect her privacy -

ironically,

brought suit against the state of Texas, challenging the constitutionality

of Texas' criminal abortion laws. The laws in question, Texas Penal Code articles 1191-1194
and 1196, outlawed abortion in all situations except one exceptional circumstance. 131 These
statutes "make it a crime to 'procure an abortion,' as therein defined, or to attempt one, except
with respect to 'an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving
the life of the mother. ",132 Roe claimed that the Texas statutes were unconstitutionally vague and
that they abridged her "right of personal privacy" apparent and protected by at least the "First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.,,133 The District Court sided with Roe,
declaring that it is a fundamental right for all women -

both married and single -

to choose

whether to bear children under the Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty
principle in the Due Process Clause. The statutes in question were unconstitutionally vague
concerning what would or would not constitute a jeopardy to the mother's life, and were
overbroad in their infringement upon Roe's right to liberty.134
Justice Harry Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in the 7-2 case, but before going into
the defense for the Court's decision, he elected to filter through the common moral objections to
abortion -

the personhood debate, maintaining the dignity ofthe physician, the state's interest
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in protecting life, and the idea oflife beginning with conception. 135 Discounting the moral
objections would allow the legal reasoning to shine through and be, ideally, free of personal
opinion on the ethical permissibility of the practice. The Court is not in place to legislate taste,
nor to shed light on ethical dilemmas that have endured since the dawn of man; the justices are
arbiters oflaw, and their only objective is to consider the constitutionality of the practice, not its
moral popUlarity. Typical conservative appeals to history and the Hippocratic Oath are null,
Blackmun declares, simply there is no compelling evidence of an historical condemnation of
abortion. Criminal abortion laws, he points out, are of relatively recent vintage, most only being
established during the latter half of the nineteenth century, so any claim that abortion has been
proscribed by our norms and values for centuries is merely arguing for effect and not from
fact. 136 The truth is actually quite to the contrary. Ancient views on abortion were much more
lenient. The Greeks and Romans, in fact, practiced abortion regularly, and "it was resorted to
without scruple."m In The Republic, Plato describes that children born deformed or from
unapproved childbirth shall be either aborted or vacated from the ideal city. Indeed, there was
little protection shown to the unborn in ancient times. 138 Granted, it is difficult to argue the
ancient perspective in modem times, but it is worth noting that abortion has not always been a
condemned practice. Also, the Hippocratic Oath is an oddity, Blackmun argues, because ancient
beliefs on abortion do not mesh with the text of the Oath. While translation from dead languages
is never completely accurate, the Oath is generally thought to read: "I will neither give a deadly
drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly, I will not
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give to a woman an abortive remedy."J39 Though Hippocrates' words appear rather clear, it is
difficult to reconcile his statements with the thoughts of his contemporaries. Language is
suspect, and debate still rages over whether Hippocrates' words actually insinuated suicide and
abortion, since the Greeks and Romans both were advocates of- or at least, tolerant ofabortion, infanticide, and suicide. 14o
Blackmun also addresses the arguments concerning fetal viability and personhood,
arguing that medically speaking, the fetus is not "quickened" movements of the fetus in utero -

the first recognizable

until around the sixteenth week of pregnancy. Common law,

he notes, has not traditionally indicted women or physicians for performing abortions before the
quickening of the fetus. 141 Though the fetus is biologically alive at this stage of development, it
is not capable of surviving without attachment to the mother's body, and until it has developed
such capacity, many, including Blackmun, argue that we cannot view the fetus as a person. 142
Perceptions vary as to when "personhood" begins. Some in the fundamentalist theological sect
argue that life begins at conception and abortion is therefore murder. One popular view that
persisted until the nineteenth century was that sustaining "animation" -

infusion with a soul -

took forty days for a male and eighty days for a female. 143 Despite all popular view, however, the
Court has declared that there is no qualification in the Constitution for what the term "person" primarily used in the Fourteenth Amendment- actually means. "No case could be cited that
holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.,,144 Moreover,
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Blackmun said, the Court will not construe the term to include the unborn, so personhood
arguments as an attack on abortion are roads to nowhere. 145
After appropriating the focus to the legal arena by showing that moral claims do not hold
weight in the justiciability of the case, Blackmun turns to the defense of the decision. The Court
recognizes openly in Roe that "the Constitution does not explicitly mention any right to privacy,"
but holds that it "has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas
or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.,,146 The opinion relies heavily on
precedent from Stanley, Katz, Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead, Griswold, Meyer, and Pierce to
illustrate the multiple times a privacy defense has been called upon by the Court. Blackmun
affirms that the "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy," and he delivers no
short list of the various aspects that the Court has designated as fundamental. 147 A brief sample
includes rights relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and childrearing and education. 148 It is not random chance that these topics all concern personal choices,
and it is no mere coincidence that they have all relied on substantive due process to support
themselves as being included in a fundamental right to privacy.
Relying on this very concept of liberty inherent in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the majority of seven declared that "this right of privacy ... is broad
.. wh eth er or not to termmate
.
h er pregnancy. ,,149
enough to encompass a woman , s deClSlon
Nevertheless, the Court does not issue a free-for-all with respect to our bodies, but recognizes
that the state does have a compelling interest in protecting life, and the right to an abortion must
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balance against this state interest. The state may impose narrowly drawn and specific limitations
on abortion, but may not draw such regulations so as to burden the mother or abridge her right to
choose. They may, for example, designate that abortions performed in the third trimester may be
done so only to save the life ofthe mother, but they may not proscribe the practice. 150
William Rehnquist's powerful dissent relies heavily on the arguments countered by
Blackmun in the majority opinion. The conservative appeal to history, morality, and prevalence
of law, however, do not stand against the overwhelming authority of constitutional claim.
Rehnquist declares that thirty-six states 1868 -

at the time of Fourteenth Amendment's adoption in

had criminal abortion laws on their books. 151 The question is, however, since when is

popularity tantamount to constitutionality? The prevalence of a law makes it no more
constitutional than the degree of faith in an opinion makes it indisputably true. The one does not
imply the other, and some better defense for the proscription of abortion is necessary.
Rehnquist attempts such a constitutional proscription with the typical conservative
defense that a right to privacy is not explicit in the text of the Constitution. "To reach its result,"
he claims, "the Court has had to find within the scope ofthe Fourteenth Amendment a right that
was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the amendment.,,152 But regardless of its
non-appearance in the body of the Constitution, the Court has on numerous occasions confirmed
its existence, and what is more, Rehnquist himself qualifies what a right to privacy under the
Fourteenth Amendment truly entails in his majority opinion in Washington v. Glucksberg in
1997. Though his opinion and defense may have held some weight in 1973, the curiosities in the
evolution of the right to privacy and the ideology of the Court point to an ever-increasing
acceptance -

even among conservatives - that the right is there somehow.

Ibid at 154-155
Ibid: at 174-175
152 Ibid, at 174

150
151

48
Though Roe is likely as controversial as the right to privacy gets, the next two decades
saw debacles of their own. In 1986, the Court heard arguments in the case of Bowers v.

Hardwick, which attempted to put sodomy on the list of activities protected by a right to privacy.
The Court, however, was unwilling to do so because, as they noted, the activities under a right to
privacy have been registered as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in
this nation's history and tradition.,,153 The Court decided that homosexual activity is neither of
these. The Court, we see, is fickle in its application of the principles and dogma of history in
deciding its cases, but this is largely attributable to those cases penned by conservative majorities
since the creation of a privacy right out of the constitutional cloth was primarily a liberal
endeavor. Nevertheless, inconsistency undermines legitimacy, and the Court looks foolish in its
opinion in this case. Byron White, in writing for the bare 5-4 majority, uses the spotlight to
chastise the Court itself for its precarious insistence on privacy rights. "The Court is most
vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.,,154 He cites
that twenty-five states have anti-sodomy laws on their books -

a statement which makes the

opinion look all the more untrustworthy, considering that Footnote six in the opinion lists thirtyeight, the most recent of which passed in 1868. 155 Once again, we must question why popularity
is believed to amount to constitutionality, and we are left to believe that the non-explicit defense
is simply the conservatives' way of jUdging taste and personal morality. It is difficult to believe
that abortion is morally permissible under the tenets of substantive due process, but sodomy is
not. As Justice John Paul Stevens says in his dissent, "the fact that the governing majority in a
state has traditionally viewed a practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), at 191-192
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prohibiting the practice.,,156 There is no compelling interest, he argues, for denying fundamental
status to such an intimate choice as to engage in the sexual activity of one's choosing.
Justice Blackmun's fiery dissent emphasized that "this case is about 'the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let
alone. ",157 Blackmun points out that the Court, in its majority, relies on the idea of homosexual
sodomy, but that in fact, the actual law makes no mention ofthe sexes of those involved in the
act, and attributes the opinion to the Court's "almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity.,,158
Not only does the claim involve "an unconstitutional intrusion into [Michael Hardwick's]
privacy and his right to intimate association," but the activity occurred in the home, which
already has Fourth Amendment privacy significance. 159 "The right of individuals to conduct
intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her home seems ... to be at the very heart of the
Constitution's protection ofprivacy.,,16o
Blackmun's powerful dissent in Bowers became the foundation for the Court's 2003
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, where the right to engage in homosexual sodomy was affirmed in
a 6-3 vote. The Court failed in Bowers, wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy, to recognize the liberty
at stake in the case. 161 The Court emphasized the precedent of Griswold's marital bedroom and

Eisenstadt's privacy of the individual, and concluded, in standard fashion, that denying persons
the right to choose their sexual partners and sexual activity is a violation of the liberty principle
in the Due Process Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, and runs counter to the very heart of
the right to privacy therein. 162
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The most recent of the activities discussed as part of a right to privacy came under fire in
1997 in the case of Washington v. Glucksberg. The case considers the right to die via physicianassisted suicide, and begins with an examination of the nation's history and opinion on the
matter, affirming that it is a crime to assist suicide in almost every state. 163 The unanimous Court
held that the Due Process Clause does not restrict liberty by denying the right to assisted suicide
simply because it guarantees fairness in allowing the refusal and/or removal of life-sustaining
medical treatment. 164 The right to refuse medical treatment was affirmed as a "constitutionally
protected liberty interest" in the case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health in
1990, when an invalid girl's parents requested to remove their daughter from life support after
clear and convincing evidence was presented that those were her wishes. 165 In a concurring
opinion in Cruzan, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor confirmed that privacy was an essential
element in this right, declaring that "the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, ifit protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical
treatment." 166
In Glucksberg, however, Rehnquist, as Chief Justice, emphasized the tenets of the
Hippocratic Oath and declared a veritable condemnation on suicide, which, as we saw earlier,
has not always been regarded as a reprehensible practice. It is, in fact, of a somewhat recent
vintage and is often regarded simply as immoral, rather than indefensible. Nevertheless, the
Court refuses to grant physician-assisted suicide and the right to die as fundamental privacy
rights because, as Rehnquist declares:
[There] has always been a process whereby the outlines of the
liberty specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment - never
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fully clarified, to be sure, and perhaps not capable of being fully
clarified - have at least been carefully refined by concrete
examples involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted
in our legal tradition. 167
The state's interest, the Court said, involves protecting the vulnerable from being taken
advantage of, as well as protecting the disabled and terminally ill from prejudice. 168 Justice
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, declared that we could not always secure that a decision to
terminate one's own life would be voluntary. There could pressure from family members to end
the economic burden of long-term care, for example, and until we can guarantee that such an
intimate decision would actually be one's own, the state must be allowed to intervene. 169 Justice
Stevens adds that allowing a fundamental right to die by physician-assisted suicide opens up the
possibility that doctors could kill patients who had become unruly or unmanageable and simply
label murder as "mercy.,,170 In sum, the Court declares that the state interest is too overwhelming
in this case to declare a fundamental liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide, refusing to
grant it privacy status.
On January 17, 2006, however, the Court handed down its ruling in the much-anticipated
case of Gonzales v. Oregon, which dealt with Oregon's 1994 Death with Dignity Act, allowing
the terminally ill to seek physician assistance in ending their own lives. The Oregon act was the
first state law in the history of the United States "authoring physicians to prescribe lethal doses
of controlled substances to terminally ill patients.,,171 The law requires counseling and
mandatory waiting periods in order to actually receive the drugs. The 6-3 majority opinion
written by Justice Kennedy never mentioned the word privacy, but rather questioned whether
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physician-assisted suicide ran counter to the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. The act was
intended to prevent physicians from dealing illicit drugs, not to define standards of general
medical practice according to state law. The Court, however, danced around the issue of granting
privacy status to the right to die by declaring that former Attorney General John Ashcroft - who
originally brought the case to court -

had acted illegally in threatening to revoke Oregon

physicians' licenses for prescribing lethal drugs to terminally ill patients. l72 Privacy issues were
not raised in this case, but its inclusion in this discussion is appropriate because of the nature of
the activity in question. The Court may not have addressed privacy here, but there is little doubt
that the right to die must be debated in this arena eventually.

172

Ibid

53
CONCLUSION
"There is a constitutional right to privacy composed of at least two distinguishable parts. One is
the privacy expressed most vividly in the Fourth Amendment: The government shall not break
into my home or my office without a warrant, based on probable cause; the government shall
leave me alone. The other is the notion ofpersonal autonomy. The government shall not make
my decisions for me. I shall make, as an individual, uncontrolled by government, basic decisions
that affect my life's course. "
- Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Unfortunately, there is no such thing as an explicit constitutional right to privacy. Such a
right, however, requires no line of text if we view the Constitution as a living document, open to
interpretation, change, and modernization. The document, as it was ratified in 1789, does not
mean the same thing now as it did then. Hosts of amendments have changed the nuance of the
American legal tradition, and a long line of Supreme Court cases point us to the belief that there
may be something there which is textually not.
Many of the basic rights we value are not present in explicit detail within the body of the
Constitution. There is no constitutionally protected right to travel, to vote, to a jury of our peers,
to marriage, to receive an education, to bear children, or to prevent conception. 173 As citizens,
however, we perceive these rights to be ours, and the Court has, on more than one occasion,
confirmed that convention goes a long way in determining and interpreting the rights of the
people.
We have no choice but to open the Constitution to a loose interpretation and to allow
judges to create rights out of the fabric that weaves our body of law. If we are to stay with the
times, with changing norms, with the greater respect for both autonomy and tolerance, then we
are left no other option. We cannot look to the Constitution as a document grounded in stone. If
it were meant to be stolid and steadfast and inflexible, it would have been written that way. It is,
however, rife with ambiguities and inconsistencies, and we leave it in the hands of those so
173

Mount

54
highly educated in constitutional law -

those arbiters of that law -

to determine what it does

and should mean.
We may argue intent of the Framers all we like, but at the end of it all, we will never
know exactly what meaning they entrusted in the text of the Constitution. We have only our
knowledge of the present and the hope for the future to guide us in our constitutional venture. It
is impossible to rationally argue that the Framers preconceived every possible conflict that could
arise under the document, and it is likewise impossible to believe that they could have had the
foresight to enumerate every last possible right the people could or should retain. It is in our
worst interest to appeal to the state of things more than two hundred years ago. Life is not the
same, the world is not the same, and "we, the people" are not the same. We labor in futility by
defending the position that they knew best.
In judging our own values, a right to privacy has come to the forefront of the
constitutional debate only recently. The concept of privacy, however, is a notion older than the
discovery of America. It is not a right that needs a line of text to support its importance, its
validity, or its necessity. Privacy is a basic human right, and has even been codified into
international law. The United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads: "No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence,
not to attacks upon his honor and reputation.,,174 How is it that the international community can
recognize so fundamental and so basic a right, but one ofthe United Nations' founding members
-

and one to sign this very charter - cannot perceive of it in its own body of law?
The paradox is absurd, but the fact remains that the Supreme Court has taken it upon

itself to advocate this right, explicit or not. We can point to six amendments that allude to a right
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to privacy, and we can read countless opinions in which the Court has defended this right over
and over again based on these penumbras and peripheries alone.
Those in denial of such a right's constitutional existence would do well to consider one
thing: What would you appeal to ifthe government suddenly took any form ofthe right to
privacy away? There is no legal doctrine, no document, nothing to use to defend the right, save
the long line of common law entirely reliant on the insinuations of six amendments. I guarantee
that the threat of removal would be sufficient to convince the most rigid of interpretivists that
something in the Constitution points to a fundamental right to privacy, whether it be the
emanations from the Bill of Rights, the unenumerated rights clause in the Ninth Amendment, or
the liberty principle in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The basic idea is that some decisions are so intimate and so personal that the government
has no business interfering with them. Life is the most precious of all of our assets, and we retain
the right to choose for ourselves what we will make of it and what it will mean to us. The denial
of privacy rights at best stands against, and at worst ignores, all of American history, world
history, and basic human dignity.
The insinuation of support for these claims in the law is undeniable: Whether we like it or
not, there is enough evidence to assure us that a right to privacy is implicitly explicit in the
Constitution.
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